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GLOBAL ETHICS, SUSTAINABILITY, AND DESIGN 
AND TECHNOLOGY EDUCATION 
INTRODUCTION 
Evocative of both family and humankind-to-come, ‘generations’ is a common 
reference for sustainability.  We look back and we look forward across generations 
and an implicit blend of emotion speaks to concerns for ‘future generations’ or 
‘inter-generational justice’.  Five witnesses who share these concerns step forward 
from the past half-century, a period spanning almost three generations.  Their 
motivations are the same motivations as this book’s authors: the achievement of 
desirable global futures.  The witnesses (and there is no shortage of others) all 
recognise that to achieve such futures what is needed is deep public engagement 
and an appropriately educated global citizenry.  Each presents a radical yet 
articulate case; values participatory democracy while critiquing Western capitalist 
democracies; draws on history yet is futures-activist; is motivated by deep values-
based concerns; and, recognises the enormity of the challenges they describe.  
They have said that: 
(T)he environment for a satisfying style of life is being undermined by all the 
emphasis on ever-greater productivity and consumption.  As a result, the 
nation faces the hazard of developing a healthy economy within the confines 
of a psychologically sick and psychologically impoverished society. 
(Packard, 1960/1963, p. 293) 
The Greatest Resource - Education (Schumacher, 1974, p. 64).  The problems 
of education are merely reflections of the deepest problems of our age…We 
are suffering from a metaphysical disease, and the cure must therefore be 
metaphysical.  Education which fails to clarify our central convictions is 
mere training or indulgence. (Schumacher, 1974, p. 83) 
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Human beings are the only species with a history.  Whether they also have a 
future is not so obvious.  The answer will lie in the prospects for popular 
human movements, with firm roots among all sectors of the population, 
dedicated to values that are suppressed or driven to the margins within the 
existing social and political order: community, solidarity, concern for a 
fragile environment that will have to sustain future generations, creative work 
under voluntary control, independent thought, and true democratic 
participation in varied aspects of life. (Chomsky, 1989/2003, p. 136) 
(Environmental Education) is a very broad area of educational activity from 
primary school to postgraduate.  It is an amazingly mixed bag, spanning the 
worst of fuzzy thinking about “nature” to the best and most insightful 
methods of engaging how humanity currently dwells in the world and needs 
to do so in other ways.  It is extremely important for it to transcend its 
original naturalistic terms of reference to embrace the “naturalised artificial”. 
(Fry, 2009, p. 243) 
If there is to be a search by the international community for a common 
ground, there must be a space for an intercultural dialogue on ethics. The 
international community must make an active effort to begin this process of 
dialogue and understanding, and to provide a space within which inter-
civilizational exchange can occur. (UNESCO, 2001, p. 1) 
 Thus, twenty-five years ago, Chomsky signalled the development, in so-called 
democracies, of the use of media for subtle ideological manipulation and control by 
governments themselves.  (Similar critiques have been applied to education: see 
e.g. Apple, [2001]).  Over fifty years ago Packard eloquently foregrounded issues 
not just about ‘ardent materialism’ and ‘planned obsolescence’ but also about the 
strategies of persuasion used by business to promote consumerism and 
consumption (Packard, 1957/1962; 1960/1963).  In 2009 Fry, in advancing his 
notion of sustainment (the overcoming of the unsustainable) rails against 
greenwashing and argues for a re-imagined and revitalised approach to our design 
thinking and practices.  Schumacher’s 1974 classic advocated ‘economics as if 
people mattered’, ‘technology with a human face’ and ‘intermediate technology’.  
At the turn of the Century, UNESCO anticipated the multiple ethical challenges 
facing humanity (and others) on the planet. 
 So why does it seem that despite over half a century of raised awareness, that 
the evidence, opinion and the literature continue to expand but real sustainable 
change seems as elusive as ever?  If our knowledge about the issues is growing 
why are the problems not being resolved?  Perhaps greenwash and scaremongering 
are working in favour of the vested interests that refuse to change.  Perhaps we are 
led to think that positive change is happening or is just around the corner when, in 
reality, the only change is superficial or peripheral.  Perhaps public global 
awareness is actually growing but has yet to reach the necessary critical mass for 
GLOBAL ETHICS, SUSTAINABILITY, AND D&T EDUCATION 
3 
change.  Assuming (which optimism suggests) that positive change is taking hold 
how will such change itself be sustainable?  
 This chapter argues that necessary, deep and lasting change needs to be 
considered as a matter of a global ethics that addresses multiple issues – amongst 
them, sustainability.  It is not enough to claim to ‘know’ that sustainability is 
something we should all care about and act upon.  The need is to see sustainability 
for its rich and problematic nature.  Sustainability issues are matters of values 
contestation which, if they are to be properly understood, debated and resolved, 
need to engage with other fields of human collaboration and enterprise as well as 
across cultures.  Especially, sustainability shares much with democracy and 
education.  Because all three are to be cherished and have common ethical 
concerns, ethics offers a meta-discourse across the triad.  Further, all three need to 
be able to ‘speak’ to each other as well as to any futures that might be shaped by 
them.  To deepen this approach, each must be of, and for, the other.  That is: 
education for democracy and sustainability; democracy for education and 
sustainability; and, sustainability for democracy and education.   
 Whatever ‘democracy’ means to different users of the term, for the purposes of 
this chapter I take it to be: government by the most ethically defensible means.  I 
am not claiming here that this is a right answer or that I am right. I frame it this 
way to signal the need that it be continuously tested and con-tested both as a 
concept and as a means of co-existing.  Democracy must remain under continuous 
ethical scrutiny and debate in order to remain democratic.  When it ceases to be 
ethical, it ceases to be democratic – and when a system of government or co-
existence ceases to be democratic, it is not ethical.  Further, if this sense of 
democracy is viable, then the principles involved could, and should, extend 
globally. 
 In turn, if democracy is ethically determined then so must the education systems 
on which it is based and for which it exists.  As White (1973) cogently argues, 
“There is at least one policy which must be in the public interest in a democracy.  
This is an appropriate education for a democracy.” (White, 1973, p. 237. Original 
emphases).  Thus education is key to the wellbeing of democracy and for the 
wellbeing of its participants.  White also argues that the determination of what 
might constitute that 'appropriate education' cannot be left to 'experts' but that 
moral judgements are central to the determination of education in, and for, 
democracy.  In short, we should all have a say in these matters. 
 Although not foregrounded in this chapter, Design and Technology Education is 
ever in the background.  In parallel to the focus a global ethics and sustainability, 
all of technologies, designs and the acts of designing, creating and using 
technologies are themselves understood to be matters of ethical contestation.  
Design and Technology Education itself warrants an ethical-democratic curriculum 
role (Keirl, 2006a). 
 Finally, this chapter has considerable limitations and these are signalled at the 
end.  In particular, there is a Western proclivity that cannot be denied.  In part, this 
is because of the need for deeper study and research by the author.  It is also 
because the general question under scrutiny is of Western making.  It is largely the 
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case that the origins of both problems and discourses around sustainability are 
Western.  Arguably, then, Western discourses may or may not be appropriate tools 
for answering the question or meeting the problems.  Thus, in arguing a case for 
looking at sustainability issues through ethical lenses it matters that some of the 
West’s key understandings and constructs be critiqued. 
Who do we think we are? (i)  
The idea of ‘self’ begs some consideration as it turns up often enough across 
ethics-democracy-education-sustainability literature.  ‘Self’ can denote any of: 
person, identity, individual, agent, actor (after Latour, 2007), being, choice-maker, 
moral entity, human, and more.  In the Western world we can talk of the 
psychological self, the sociological self, the philosophical self.  There are negations 
too – self as not ‘the other’, not an object, or not common.  
 Otherwise, as UNESCO (2001) alerts us, “For the Buddhist tradition…the 
beginning of ethics consists of a detachment of the ‘self’, of a ‘no self’…(and that) 
a ‘self’ in the Western sense may not be taken as a reference point for ethical 
theory.  But one can translate the ‘self’ and ‘self-relationship’ to the term 
‘autonomy’” (UNESCO, 2001 pp. 12-13).  Meanwhile, in the Confucian tradition 
there is no equivalent to the modern Western notion of self and the individual.  
Rather, the Confucian self is “…a relational self, defined through social institutions 
and relationships, characterized by interrelatedness among family, friends, 
communities, countries and the universe, and is marked by a sense of mutuality, 
responsibility and obligation.” (UNESCO, 2001, p. 15). 
 Within the Western frame a particular ethical concern is the notion of self-
interest.  At one extreme there is the absolute selfishness that can be manifested in 
ruthlessness, winning, surviving, maximisation of personal assets, and so on.  This 
selfishness holds the interests of particular persons above those of other persons, 
other species and the world at large.  A contrasting position, long-established and 
gaining renewed currency is the recognition that our best ‘self’-interests are 
actually served by looking after the ‘common good’ through cooperation and 
collaboration.  In its deepest form, such a position affords equal rights to all species 
and environments.  
 Singer (1995) discusses the “age of self interest” suggesting that “…human 
nature may have evolved to be capable of more than narrow self-interest” (Singer, 
1995, p. 24).  He offers his broader conception of “enlightened self-interest” 
arguing that we are better served by working rationally and collaboratively than by 
working selfishly.  In a subsequent work (Singer, 2004) advancing the case for a 
global ethical community, he discusses national self-interest and how ethical 
discourse is now looking beyond the idea of inter-national with its implicit 
assemblage of so many sovereign states with their own identities and borders, 
towards the goal of a one-world global community. 
 Wood (2007) talks of eco-solipsism – of the narcissistic self trying to ‘be’ in 
what he describes as ‘the cult of celebrity, vanity, and self-presentation’ and the 
development of “…a new ethics of the individual in which the environmental 
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responsibilities of citizens became eclipsed by their implicit rights as consumers.  
Clearly, from an ecological perspective we can see that few individuals could adopt 
this mode of living without causing enormous environmental damage.” (Wood, 
2007, p. 35).  More recently, Bennett (2010) takes self-interest in a different 
direction arguing that it could embrace her notion of the vibrant materiality that 
runs through all things, animate and inanimate (in the Latourian sense of attributing 
them with agency).  As with Singer, Wood and many others, she will not dissolve 
the very relationships we inevitably hold with all matter and species.  Thus, by 
acknowledging such interdependence we can adopt another kind of enlightened 
self-interest.  Bennett argues that environmentalism, ‘…invented in the 1970s…’, 
was, in the 2000s, making a comeback with a whole range of concerns and 
practical problems stirring an American public from their ‘fatalistic passivity’ 
(after Guattari). “This comeback was motivated in large part by self-interest, by a 
fear of the environmental ‘blowback’ of human actions.” (Bennett, 2010, p. 110).   
 A key challenge to sustainability is that of anthropocentrism – a different sense 
of self-interest.  To contemplate, analyse, speculate or critique from a solely 
human-centred position is to take either an academically selfish or an impoverished 
approach – or both.  As with enlightened self-interest, we are collectively the 
poorer when we deliberately fail to see or acknowledge the ‘other’ which, 
alongside us, constitutes the global whole.  To critique our anthropocentrism raises 
questions of our existence when we recognise that we, as persons, are not sole 
existences or beings but that our existence is actually a matter of multiple co-
existences.  Thus, we can consider ourselves as being-with or co-existing in four 
different realms: with other humans; with other species; with the planet; and, with 
technologies.   This framing is not intended to be reductionist or anti-ecological in 
nature.  It was offered (Keirl, 2010) to help educators engage with Technology’s 
complexity and seeming invisibility in our everyday lives.  Here, it is offered as the 
background against which sustainability can be contextualised. 
 A further concept to introduce in relation to ‘self’ is Bildung which has a rich 
history in German culture and is valid for the concerns of this chapter.  Bildung 
offers a special sense of education - one that qualitatively exceeds the kinds of 
instrumentalist schooling being advanced in many contemporary societies.  In his 
1975 magnum opus critiquing Enlightenment reason, Gadamer (1975/2004) writes 
that Bildung is not a matter of “…a technical construction, but grows out of an 
inner process of formation and cultivation, and therefore constantly remains in a 
state of continual Bildung.” (Gadamer, 1975/2004, p. 10).  Bildung as such cannot 
be a goal – it is a continuous becoming with no goals outside of itself.  It is not 
about the cultivation of particular talents (witness current instrumental educational 
agendas to ‘train’ and ‘prepare’ students for jobs and markets).  It is at once both 
sustainable and sustaining. 
 Bildung as (self-)formation is holistic and lifelong with strong dimensions of 
self-reflection, self-critique and transformation.  Rather than adopting a passive 
acceptance of some kind of ‘natural consciousness’, the aim is the development of 
“…working consciousness (which) contains all the elements that make up practical 
Bildung: the distancing from the immediacy of desire, of personal need and private 
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interest, and the exacting demand of a universal.” (Gadamer 1975/2004, p. 12).  He 
also advances the need for receptivity to “…’otherness’…keeping oneself open to 
what is other – to other, more universal points of view…To distance oneself from 
oneself and from one’s private purposes means to look at these in the way that 
others see them.” (Gadamer 1975/2004, p. 15).  In turn, what is sought is a 
“cultivated consciousness” which has “…more the character of a sense…It is a 
universal sense.”  (Gadamer 1975/2004, p. 16). 
 Bildung not only works holistically to develop a critical-ethical self but it also 
works to develop society and is ever self-questioning to ‘build better’.  The concept 
strongly epitomises the sustainable-self, the self who, through reflection and action, 
seeks to build for the greater good.  In this light, growth is not of the kind the 
capitalist project promulgates.  Rather, it is all of inward-, outward-, and future-
focused growth.  It models a very enlightened self-interest that contributes to the 
common good. 
Who do we think we are? (ii)  
Something must be said about the term ‘human’ and such derivatives as humanity, 
humankind, human being, humanism and human nature.  We use human and 
humankind to refer to our own species and we describe ourselves as human beings 
which usefully keeps a hint of the existential present – our be-ing human.  But we 
also talk ethically of human behaviour, our shared humanity, inhumanity, humane 
treatment and so on.  Some brief commentary on human nature and some 
exploration of post/humanism is needed. 
 In discussing sustainability, the concept of human nature (or any use of 
‘nature’) is a shaky one.  For one thing, it can be culturally specific in how it is 
applied.  Indeed, for some cultures, the concept could be puzzling.  To talk of a 
human nature as opposed to other natures or in the light of a unifying singular 
Nature begs contention.  The need is that we are mindful of multiple, 
contextualised uses of ‘human nature’.  Warnock (1998, p. 21) reminds us that 
“natural” is a “slippery and evanescent” concept.  Nature, for some, is just stuff, a 
thing, or so many materials.  In educating for sustainability, we know now that we 
should think otherly, as Wood (2007, p. 188) does when he invites us to see Nature 
as “emergence and flow”.   
 Philosophically, humanism celebrates humanity for its own sake and its own 
perceived qualities resisting not only any supernatural or divine orientation but also 
scientific descriptions that position humans simply as part of (or at the top of) a 
‘natural order of things’.  Humanism emerged from a reaction against religion or a 
God as the centre of all things (thus a humanist-agnostic/atheist tendency) toward a 
new centring around a reasoning humankind.  In turn, humanism offered an ethics 
that was reason-based, that is, reason over emotions and prejudice rather than, say, 
a pure scientific rationalism (Lacey, 1995).  As with any socially concerned group, 
positions amongst humanists vary according to values, philosophy or politics.  
Recently, UNESCO reports that: “Changes in the world call for the development of 
a new humanism that is not only theoretical but practical, that is not only focused 
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on the search for values – which it must also be – but oriented towards the 
implementation of concrete programmes that have tangible results.” (Bokova, 
2010). 
 Emergent critiques show that the concept human, or its derivatives, cannot be 
taken as a ‘given’.  For a start, any centring of worldviews or actions based on the 
idea of human is itself inherently anthropocentric.  Just as emergent humanism 
facilitated new ways of knowing and of conceptualising ourselves in a special 
‘human’ way, so, as new understandings emerge, might the conceptualisation itself 
become redundant.  “As the archaeology of our thought easily shows, man (sic) is 
an invention of recent date.  And one perhaps nearing it’s end.” (Foucault, 
1989/2000, p. 29).  Here, post-humanism presents itself and we should briefly 
consider its two broad strands that speak to matters of ethics, education and 
democracy in relation to sustainability.   
 First, there is a humanities or social sciences postmodern sense of overcoming 
and reconceptualizing the human both inwardly and outwardly – looking inwardly 
to a reconceptualisation of the person and outwardly to all the relations (our co-
existences) that we hold and which reciprocally shape us (Badmington, 2000; 
Fukuyama, 2003; Habermas, 2003; Bostrom, 2009; Wolfe, 2010).  In this sense, 
Verbeek (2009, p. 251) discusses posthumanism as “…development beyond 
humanism as a predominant way of understanding what it means to be human.”  In 
this arena, we might say that constructs such as human and its relations are no 
longer sustainable. 
 Second, there is a more technological perspective of our human-technology 
coexistence which suggests, acknowledges or advances our transhumanism - as 
Verbeek (2009, p. 251) puts it: “…the ‘transhumanist’ development towards an 
enhanced version of Homo Sapiens…” Again, positions vary but one focal idea is 
that our merging technologies – across existences - are reaching a point described 
as Singularity (Vinge, 1993; Broderick, 2001; Kurzweil, 2005; Bostrom, 2009) 
and/or convergence (Schmidt, 2008) whereby we no longer talk of co-existence as 
existing ‘with’ or ‘alongside’ but, rather, as a fully integrated one.  For Kurzweil 
(2005), posthumanism is the term for the period that will follow the Singularity in 
(views vary) three to five decades time. In this arena, we might say that constructs 
such as human and its relations are sustainable – at least through the Kurzweilian 
(1999, p. 14) take that technology is “evolution by other means”. 
 Of course, there is the also the view of the future where human-caused planetary 
crises will lead to our own self-destruction - the doomsday scenario – pessimistic 
but plausible.  In this post-extinction arena the question of human sustainability 
becomes null and Gaia (Lovelock, 1979) may be left to look after the planet.  
Bostrom (2009) offers four possible “families of scenarios for humanity’s future” 
(Bostrom, 2009, p. 194) one of which is extinction.  The others are recurrent 
collapse: “in which human civilization oscillates indefinitely within a range of 
technological development characteristic of a human condition” (Bostrom, 2009, p. 
199) that is, peaking and troughing somewhere between our pre-human and the 
post-thuman states; plateau (of either technological increase reaching a plateau 
pre-posthumanism or of technological stasis close to the current level; and 
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posthumanity (for which he offers several criteria and possible manifestations one 
of which is the “singularity hypothesis” (Bostrom, 2009, p. 204). 
 Whatever is happening in terms of humanity’s evolution, we should note that: i) 
parallel discourses are developing which draw us into rethinking our 
understandings of being human; ii) those discourses should be taken into account 
in our thinking about sustainability – both as a concept and as action in, and on the 
world; iii) all the possible scenarios are fundamentally technological; iv) whatever 
the case, there are challenging ethical issues at play; and that, v) we need to rethink 
what an appropriate education might be for whichever circumstance we 
contemplate. 
Considering ethics… 
With any consideration of being human comes recognition that ethics is 
particularly and necessarily a human construct concerning our behaviour.  “Moral 
value is something which springs into being only when there is an actual human 
agent deciding what to do, and doing it”. (Warnock, 1970, p. 4).  So long as people 
have interacted, ethics has been evidenced in mythology, in collaborative (rather 
than competitive) efforts towards coexistence, and in religion.  All cultures and 
communities have developed moral codes and a rich interplay of emotion, 
spirituality, aesthetics, imagination, and more contribute to ethical coexistence.  
Sooner or later the classic ethical questions: How should I live?  How should we 
live? What is right?  What is good? and so on, are engaged by individuals and 
communities alike.  Such questions beg discourses around values and the 
moderation of value differences is what can facilitate reasonable coexistence.  That 
is, we act in ways that seek to understand, and to consider, values that we may not 
ourselves hold. 
 Midgley (1993, p. 3) reminds us that the origins of ethics can be considered in 
two particular ways: “…one about historical fact and the other about authority” and 
the distribution of both authority and agency are central to ethical values discourse 
and to the question of who gets to participate in ethical determinations.  This is a 
highly significant issue when considering the extent, or otherwise, of participation 
in democratic decision-making around preferred and sustainable futures.  The 
history of ethics also shows variations in its perceived practical value.  Largely 
constrained to the Academy in the 1960s, “…(r)eal subjects…” subsequently 
became “…the proper concern of moral philosophers.” says Warnock (1998, p. 12-
13).  Fortunately, that trend has continued, greatly stimulated by the very real 
ethical issues presented by technologies.  
 Despite growth in the recognition of the need to see ethics-as-practice, whether 
for daily life or for technological assessment, pitfalls remain.  There are challenges 
such as relativism (“It’s all a matter of opinion”) and those of religious and 
political dogma (“This is right/that is wrong”). As Blackburn has it: “There must 
be a course between the soggy sands of relativism and the cold rocks of 
dogmatism.” (Blackburn, 2001, p. 26).  He also observes that “…one peculiarity of 
our present climate is that we care much more about our rights than about our 
GLOBAL ETHICS, SUSTAINABILITY, AND D&T EDUCATION 
9 
‘good’” (Blackburn, 2001, p. 4).  Differently, we can have concerns about 
pervasive capitalism’s capacity to colonise language to its own ends when it talks 
of ‘ethical business’ or ‘ethical consumerism’ as though such terms are ‘innocent’ 
(after Galbraith, 2004) when they might actually be greenwash, even oxymoronic.  
Solomon (1993) points to Aristotle’s distinction between (acceptable) household 
trading “…essential to the working of any even modestly complex society…” and 
“…unsavoury and unproductive…” trade for profit. (Solomon, 1993, p. 355).   
 Today, most Western societies are being led and shaped by globalised 
capitalism that valorises egoistic or selfish self-interest over enlightened self-
interest.  However, we have alternative ethical models to draw upon.  To take just 
two: first, there are the deeply holistic perspectives and practices of Aboriginal 
peoples whose intimate relationship with land is generally beyond Western 
understanding but which is a paragon in the history of sustainability.  Second, there 
is the principled assessment of technologies weighed against the communal good 
as practised by the Amish (Sclove, 1995; Kraybill, 1989/2001; Nye, 2007).   
Common criticisms applied by advocates of the dominant Western model to 
Aboriginal or Amish ways, are at worst a form of derision and at best a technical 
critique – one constrained to criteria of efficiency, profit, production and ‘progress’ 
(a now largely debunked bedfellow of capitalism).  However, when an ethical 
perspective and analysis is applied to the varying models of ways-of-being-in-the-
world, capitalist criteria alone are inadequate, impotent or, perhaps, are no longer 
sustainable. 
 Any pursuit of ethical criteria or for ‘ways-to-be’ ethically soon leads us to see 
why ethics (like Technology) is a contested field.  Sometimes the breadth of 
contestation (as with Technology) leads people to indifference or apathy: “It’s all 
too hard; what’s the difference?; just get on with it”.  So it can help to know 
something of the options and issues at play.  Somerville (2000) describes the 
‘schools of ethics’ thus:   
Among the diverse schools are principle-based or deontological ethics; 
situational ethics; utilitarian ethics; consequentialist ethics; casuist or case-
based ethics (…similar to the legal doctrine of precedent); narrative ethics; 
feminist ethics; hermeneutical ethics (…based on interpretation of a context 
or text); and virtues or character ethics.... (Somerville, 2000, p. 289) 
 She points out that, if all of such ‘schools’ were to respond in unison to an 
ethical issue, there would be no ethical dilemma.  However, it is more often the 
case that there is disagreement.  Because ethics is about values and values 
difference, like design, it demands a weighing up of possibilities around matters 
that are controversial.  Each of us has a value system or a set of values over which 
we have choices and it is for each of us not only to defend our values but also to 
modify them in the light of new experiences or better alternatives.  Many 
associated concepts inform ethical or values discourse and help it have a presence 
in our daily thinking and behaviours.  We debate terms such as good and right (and 
their counterparts); we discuss the respective merits of cooperation, collaboration 
and competition; we assess risk; we trust; we care; and, we develop empathy as 
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both value and skill (Rogers, 2006).  All such values have something about them 
which Warnock (1998) offers as ‘timeless values’: they turn up across the ages in 
all cultures and societies. 
 For each of us, tensions and contradictions arise when it comes to deciding how 
to act ethically, that is, to be a moral agent.  Here, the question of the self returns.  
We might seek to educate to create the autonomous or self-determining individual - 
but such an education would need to help the individual balance any claim to their 
‘rights’ with an equal accommodation of their duties and responsibilities too.  The 
concept of consciousness must also play a role.  We can talk of levels of 
consciousness within the person (as with self-awareness) but there is also the 
degree of consciousness we hold towards the world beyond ourselves.  In this 
realm it is possible to hold a false consciousness that masks one’s awareness of the 
true state of the world at large.  The term is drawn from Marxist theory to describe 
“…the masking effect of ideology, which cloaks the true conditions of things, thus 
inhibiting the mobilization of political activism.” (Buchanan, 2010, p. 161).  We 
have already witnessed Gadamer’s (1975/2004) promotion of Bildung being 
grounded in understandings of working consciousness and cultivated consciousness 
while Keirl & McLaren (2013) have written of altered consciousness with regard 
to choice and children’s designing and technological thinking.  All these 
configurations of consciousness must hold a place in shaping education for 
sustainability. 
Ethical being and the common good 
From a strongly argued a romanticist perspective, Beiser (2003) affirms Bildung as 
an on-going, holistic maximisation of self engaged in many fields of 
accomplishment whilst concurrently contributing to the maximised and holistic 
common good of multiple selves.  To this we can add the Ancient Greek concept of 
eudaimonia, not readily translated but which can refer to happiness (though not in 
the purely subjective or selfish sense). This might be better expressed as welfare, 
human flourishing, or the pursuit of the highest human good.  So, in considering 
ideas of what it means for people to be fulfilled, flourishing or achieving self-
realisation, we consider the good – not only for persons but for all people, that is, 
as a common good. 
 The idea of the common good is a worthy one but it has tended to be thought of 
as applying to and within particular communities or societies.  As the witnesses 
attest, the common good must now be global and future-focussed.  Are there 
particular ethical approaches that might contribute usefully to such an outlook?  
How might a practical ethics meet our aims?  Certainly a deontological approach, 
(Greek deontos: duty) might inform our actions through prior-formulated rules or 
principles such as ‘Do no harm’; a virtue ethics might inform our sense of how we 
should aspire to what is right and good; a narrative ethics might see ourselves in 
ethical stories; or a hermeneutic approach might invite ethical discourse as a matter 
of context-based interpretation.  For the challenge of sustainability, all schools or 
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dispositions of ethical thought have something to contribute but aspects of 
utilitarianism offer some particular possibilities.  
 Utilitarianism takes a consequentialist approach to ethics in that it is concerned 
with the weighing of the consequences of actions.  In fact, Blackburn (2001) 
reminds us that utilitarian principles can be used to weigh other ethical approaches 
themselves.  Often too simply described as ‘the greatest happiness for the greatest 
number’, our understanding can be deepened if we think instead of ‘wellbeing’ or 
‘interests’ rather than the perhaps egoistic and subjective-sounding ‘happiness’.  As 
Griffin (1995) points out, we might think less in terms of ‘number’ (the 
quantitative) and more towards ‘the optimum’ (the qualitative).  Thus, this is 
perhaps an ethics of optimising wellbeing or: “utility as welfare maximisation” 
(Goodin, 1993, p. 244).  Utilitarianism is also an approach capable of considering 
multiple consequences and accommodating multiple agents including those beyond 
humans, on which, more below. 
 It is precisely because utilitarianism is forward-looking that it is of value to our 
concerns for all of: education, democracy and sustainability.  While it may be 
informed by other ethical approaches or principles it is not bound by them.  As 
Blackburn says:  
It deals with value – with things being good or bad, or better or worse… 
Deontological notions of justice, rights, duties, fit into a moralistic climate, 
where things just are right or wrong, permissible or punishable.  These are 
the words of law, as much as words of ethics.  Utilitarianism by contrast 
gives us the language of social goods… (And, appropriately for this book’s 
readership - SK) The cast of mind is that of the engineer, not the judge’  
(Blackburn, 2001, p. 75-76). 
 Also via utilitarianism, Midgley’s (1993) ‘authority’ dimension of ethics can be 
a more distributed one.  It is arguably better for more people to contribute to a 
forward-looking ethic than is possible when ‘authority’ lies in the hands of a few or 
is ascribed to a dogma.  To paraphrase Goodin (1993, p. 248): ‘What should we do, 
collectively?’ is much more the utilitarian question than ‘How should I live, 
personally?’  This, of course, does not sit well with those few who would claim to 
hold moral authority and it is here that feminist ethical critiques have taken on 
matters of enculturation and gendered power distribution (see e.g. Tong & 
Williams, 2011).  Given some of the alternatives, there is a case to argue that 
utilitarianism offers a democratic means for ethical determination through debate 
and action pursued across time, place and cultures: that is, to effect a global ethical 
conversation. (Singer, 1993; Somerville, 2000; Blackburn, 2001; UNESCO, 2001, 
Berman, 2009). 
Ethics as practical action 
Ethics as it is embraced for this chapter is considered as practical philosophy for 
practical action for the sustainable good.  Not only should the field be properly 
theorised but it should also be seen as a way forward, indeed, as a way of life or a 
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way of being.  To lay any claim as to how the future should be is surely to call 
forth an ethical position.  Such is the case if we are to talk of sustainable futures. 
 While we might work from some prior established principles, shaping the future 
in an activist way brings some interesting considerations.  In the literature it is not 
uncommon to come across Aldo Leopold’s dictum: ‘A thing is right when it tends 
to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community.  It is wrong 
when it tends otherwise’ (see, e.g. Orr, 2005, p. 93, Haupt, 2011, p. 8).  But is a 65 
year-old rule sufficient to guide today’s or future considerations?  Perhaps.  Its 
eloquence certainly exceeds the limiting and conditioning language of many 
current claims of what constitutes ‘good’ or ‘right’.  While the deontological 
approach has its merits it can be seen that Leopold’s words beg much discussion if 
they are to inform ‘right action’ towards the future. 
 What emerges here are the different kinds of values under discussion.  For 
example, Frankena (1973) distinguishes between moral and non-moral values, 
while we can also look to instrumental and intrinsic, or non-instrumental, values.  
One attempt at building on such distinctions sought to develop the idea of visioning 
values to serve future-focussed ethical-design curriculum (Keirl, 2006b).  Being 
aware of these qualitative differences matters because the emergent debates 
become both personal and public in nature.  For example, when it comes to the 
assessment of the designing and bringing into being of technologies, qualitative, 
moral and non-instrumental values must be engaged to appreciate the full picture.  
Many technologies (i.e. products) are produced simply for profit.  Differently, for 
too long technological assessment has been little more than an increasingly subtle, 
coded language game around the lowest common denominator: “Does it work?”  
When Feenberg (2010) distinguishes between the cultural roles of technology and 
craft he notes the differentiation of technical activity and social activity: 
“Specifically, technical knowledge is separated out from the prevailing aesthetic 
and ethical values”.  Technical know-how is one thing but, in craft, the spectrum of 
values “…form a single complex” (Feenberg, 2010, p. 183). 
The temporal and ethics  
A few considerations should also be given to some temporal aspects of ethics in 
practice.  For example, Somerville argues for ‘ethics time’ to conduct technological 
assessments – particularly with regard to major emergent technologies like 
xenotransplantation or nanotechnology.  This resonates with ‘slow’ movement 
thinking configured as ‘slow design activism’ by Fuad-Luke (2010).   
Design is a powerful vehicle by which to encourage people to aspire and 
achieve new ways of living, working and recreating.  Design should spend 
less time on envisioning utopias and focus more on what American architect 
Bruce Goff called “the continuous present”….Design can reconnect us to a 
wider world where the ambition could be to encourage…eudaimonia, or 
human flourishing.  Slow design offers that potent ‘reconnection’ to discover 
more eudaimonia. (Fuad-Luke, 2010, p. 150).   
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 Wood  (2007) also looks to a future of eudaimonia that contributes to the good 
of others: ‘Maintaining a quest for personal happiness is important, but it will also 
be vital to develop an active ethics of eudemonia (sic) that enshrines self-
actualisation within situated altruism.’ (Wood, 2007, p. 200).   
 While sustainability is forever concerned with the future, and design itself is 
about acting with intention on the future, history and hindsight both inform such 
perspectives.  However a charge against some approaches to history is that of  
‘presentism’: the judging or interpreting of past events using criteria of present-day 
moral views, that is: we ought not to judge the past by current ethical standards.  
Just as an extreme anthropocentrism can amount to speciesism (“…considered 
morally on par with sexism and racism” [Gruen, 1993, p. 350]) so we might think 
about our current moral perspectives and any risk of presentism.  In anticipating 
‘preferred futures’ we might acknowledge not only that we must hold our strongest 
and best-thought-through ethical case for acting towards the future, but also that we 
should be ready to adapt and reconsider that position as realities manifest 
themselves.  Thus our ethically-grounded sustainability aspirations may simply 
need to be sustainably aspirational, that is, under continuous scrutiny for whatever 
would be (ethically) better. 
 The ethics literature (see eg Singer, 1993) highlights the problematics around 
intention and foresight and technology researchers have begun to signal caution 
towards any claim to certainty of outcome regarding designed futures.  Tenner 
(1997) reported on the unintended consequences and ‘revenge effects’ of designed 
technologies and, building on earlier work around the intentional fallacy (from 
literary criticism), Ihde (2006) has offered the designer fallacy as a caution against 
congruence between any designer intention and a technology’s use. 
 With foresight in mind there has been much expression over the last three 
decades of the precautionary principle which suggests that unless there is 
consensus or evidence that harm will not occur, or that consequences are fully 
understood, then a new technology should not be developed.  As Sunstein’s (2005) 
critique of the principle shows, there is a plethora of issues at play in the 
assessment of risk, for example: fear; precaution versus paralysis; compromise of 
civil liberties; expertise vs ignorance; short-termism of people and governments 
alike; people being “unrealistically optimistic”; or their tending “…to reduce 
cognitive dissonance, sometimes by treating risks as though they are tiny, even 
worth ignoring” (Sunstein, 2005, pp. 52-53).  Sunstein’s work cautions us 
ethically, socially and politically about the limits and potential of the precautionary 
principle.  Once more, for all a seemingly valid and well-intentioned ethical 
‘principle’ can inform considerations about sustainability, it must be maintained 
under critique for its limitations.  Whether looking to the future; trying to act 
ethically towards the future; trying to design, or to ‘engineer’ the future; it would 
seem appropriate to move with a nuanced blend of ethics of intention and an ethics 
of caution.  
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Moral considerability and those others with whom (and with which) we coexist 
Moral philosophy also debates an important concept regarding our several 
coexistences.  Moral considerability emerges from the question of how we treat 
others.  Writing on world poverty, Dower (1993) argues that people, as moral 
agents with choices, should consider the effects of their choices on the wellbeing of 
others.  It doesn’t matter whether the ‘others’ are part of the same moral 
community as those with choices.  What is significant is that moral consideration 
is extended to others.  In turn, under a life-centred ethics, anything living is eligible 
for moral consideration: “…even the whole biosphere itself…A life-centred ethic 
counts all living things as morally considerable although not necessarily of moral 
significance” (Elliot, 1993, p. 287). 
 But should matters rest there?  With the Singularity comes the blurring of the 
natural and the artificial, and the interface of the bitsphere and the biosphere 
(Franklin, 1990/2004).  As Bennett (2010) speculates: “Perhaps the ethical 
responsibility of an individual human now resides in one’s response to the 
assemblages in which one finds oneself participating…” (Bennett, 2010, p. 37).  
Verbeek (2006) has argued for moral considerability towards ‘things’ – all those 
technologies that mediate our lives, with which we also coexist. 
…(T)he argument that things do not possess intentionality and cannot be held 
responsible for their “actions” does not justify the conclusion that things 
cannot be part of the moral community… 
When the actions of human beings are not only determined by their own 
intentions but also by the material environment in which they live, the central 
place of the autonomous subject in ethical theory needs to be put in 
perspective.  Once we do that, it becomes clear that it might indeed be 
necessary to move the source of ethics, which had already been moved from 
God to humans, one place further. (Verbeek, 2006, p. 121). 
 Verbeek doesn’t declare the concept of human to be obsolete but, rather, he 
advocates a posthumanist ethics that need not abandon humanist values, giving 
“…a central place to the idea that the human can only exist in its relations to the 
non-human…(and)…In order to cultivate humanity, we need to take seriously how 
technologies also help to cultivate us.” (Verbeek, 2009, p. 261). 
Established and emergent technologies 
Apart from all that we are gradually learning to critique about existing 
technologies, we have a spectrum of emergent technologies that are both 
accelerating the re-shaping of our (co)existences and formimg the foundations for 
the Singularity and Bostrom’s (2009) scenarios.  Major candidates include: 
nanotechnologies; xenotransplantation; artificial intelligence; and, genetic 
engineering (of any species).  Most recent is ‘big data’ which brings its own 
capacities for reshaping existences in ethically problematic ways.  The well-
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established issue of data quality (garbage in/garbage out) becomes hugely 
magnified: “We are more susceptible than we many think to the ‘dictatorship of 
data’ – that is, to letting the data govern us in ways that may do as much harm as 
good.” (Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier, 2013, p. 166).  Issues of privacy, still not 
fully understood, are now compounded by issues of probability: “…the risk that we 
may judge people not just for their actual behaviour but for propensities the data 
suggests they have.” (Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier, 2013, p. 192, my italics).  
When policymakers or businesses have access to, and control over, mass data, all 
of democracy, education and sustainability become ethically challenged.  The fact 
remains that, established or emergent, every technology is an ethically complicated 
navigation of values. 
 This very fact is a pointer to the challenge of trying to ‘see’ technologies for 
what they are.  Whether a canal, a washing-up brush or a form of government, the 
mistake is in trying to understand any technology as an ‘it’ rather than the holism it 
represents.  Technologies can be critiqued holistically, democratically, ethically 
and sustainably by interrogating their circumstances across five interdependent 
phases: intention; design; realisation; use; and, consequences (Keirl, 2009).  
Conducting such interrogations opens up the ethics of coexistences, futures and our 
very sense of being human.  Further, issues of our democratic engagement in, or 
marginalisation from, technological enactments also raise questions around choice 
as moral agency or choice as illusion.  If choices are only presented to us at the 
realisation stage (once a technology has come into being) then our capacity for 
effective, democratic choice-making is greatly reduced.  In such a situation, it is 
already too late to discuss sustainability concerns which begged critique at the very 
intention stage - even before any designing is undertaken. 
 It has been the absence of democratic participation at these early phases of a 
technology’s development that has disempowered citizens and publics from 
helping shape sustainable futures.  For too long our ethical perspectives have been 
reactive rather than proactive: witnessed by the cycle of technological creation - 
negative consequence - remedial legislation.  Street talk still echoes 
Enlightenment/capitalist faith in ‘progress’ and simplistic technological 
determinism (see e.g. Smith & Marx, 1994) both of which position citizens as mute 
and powerless in technological decision-making. 
Developing the necessary conversations 
It can be argued that we are somewhat ‘caught’ at present in that, not being used to 
collective determination of possible and preferred futures, we are conditioned to 
accept that “that’s the way things are going” as our (determined) lot in life.  There 
are two ways we might think about the future.  First, there is the Future (big ‘F’) - 
a whole, not just something ahead of now but a way of being, living, relating, 
feeling and knowing. The Future in this holistic, amorphous sense is not only 
unknown but is imagined by each of us in differing ways.  Nonetheless, the Future 
is something towards which we can offer moral considerability and we can do this 
through multiple conversations.  Thus, while we can talk reflectively and 
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imaginatively about the Future, we can also talk pragmatically about, and act on, a 
range of futures (small ‘f’) – multiple and coincident because of our coexistences.  
Our personal futures are considered not only alongside those of other people but 
also alongside those of other species, technologies, and the planet.   
 While education is key to developing citizen engagements in ethically 
defensible global futures, any such education needs to work across communities, 
societies, cultures and boundaries (whether physical, political or otherwise).  It 
needs to be multi-located: in homes; through responsible media; in the street; 
through policy; and, in formal educational settings.  In turn, multiple conversations 
are needed, both deliberative and activist, around a range of futures-orientated 
concepts that can inform an ethics of sustainability.  From what has been said, 
these could include: 
– The problematics of self, of human, of other; 
– The interests of whoever and whatever constitutes the moral community – 
including both knowledge interests (Habermas, 1971) and ‘self’ interests; 
– Bostrom’s (2009) scenarios for humanity’s future; 
– Maintaining ideal visions as practical, futures-focussing devices (candidates 
include: democracy, Bildung, eudaimonia, the common good); 
– Moral imagination and creativity (Warnock, 1998; Mackay, 2004; Somerville, 
2006); 
– Empathy and multiple forms of consciousness; 
– Choice and all its manifestations from Singer’s (1995) ultimate choices to our 
daily choices and the moral context of choice-making; 
– Rights and responsibilities as ethics of democracy and ethics of duty; 
– Moral considerability across all four realms of co-existence; 
– Design, utilitarianism and consequentialism as futures-orientated; 
– Ethics time and timeless values; 
– Care: “Caring is primarily forward-looking in orientation.” (Dower, 1993, p. 
275); and, 
– Ethics as engineering (or design) rather than judgement. 
 This is not an ethical checklist and the concepts exemplify how ethics (as with 
sustainability itself) is a process rather than a destination.  To build and to maintain 
conversations around these concepts is to build a discourse of, and for, 
sustainability.  Both Warren (1995) and Blackburn (2001) report Habermas’s case 
for a discourse ethics that is dialogical in nature and seeks to facilitate 
conversations between concerned parties.  Fuad-Luke’s design activism advances 
“…participatory democratic spaces for co-design decision-making in the form of a 
MootSpace, building on historic examples (the Anglo-Saxon moot) and 
contemporary practices (the Maori marae)” (Fuad-Luke, 2010, p. 151).  
Meanwhile, to return to the fifth witness, UNESCO cautions that: 
All of us involved in the dialogue on ethics must be aware of our own 
cultural references and roots, and must not claim universality, nor blindly 
pretend to cultural ‘neutrality’. Our hope is to raise awareness of the deep 
world heritage of ethical wisdom, and to promote mutual learning and 
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understanding for an ‘authentic’ dialogue on the values that are to guide the 
evolution of the 21” Century.  (UNESCO, 2001, Annex II, p. 5) 
 In the Western world, we have been conditioned to measure life instrumentally 
and competitively within and across national borders.  But there is significant 
difference between ‘standard of living’ and ‘quality of life’ and it is the latter 
which is the concern of the witnesses.  To advance sustainability in ways that 
qualitatively enhance the wellbeing of all that exists on the planet can only be done 
by a comprehensive and ongoing engagement with a global ethics.  In advancing a 
case for the consideration of ethics for sustainability I have also argued the ethical 
interdependence of sustainability, democracy and education (and, thus, Design and 
Technology education) – that they speak to, for, and of, each other ethically.  To 
advance the quality of one is to advance the quality of them all. 
 As Blackburn says: “Ethics is disturbing” (Blackburn, 2001, p. 7) but then so is 
the enormity of our global concerns.  Ethics today is developing as a versatile, 
practical, philosophical tool but skills in using and maintaining the tool are needed 
by everyone.  Hence the role of education and the global village in helping students 
become skilful ethical practitioners and activists.  Education and, thus, Design and 
Technology education, now faces a major set of choices around whether it will be 
maintainer of the status quo or agency of change for heightened global ethical 
consciousness and practice. 
Coda 
This chapter has offered only a selective overview of some key fields of enquiry – 
not least, ethics itself.  Several ‘isms’ warrant expansion, notably: determinism, 
humanism, existentialism, idealism, and anthropocentrism.  A similar case stands 
for a range of ‘posts-‘, notably: posthumanism (Wolfe, 2010); postmaterialism 
(Bennett, 2010); and, regarding technologies, postphenomenology (Ihde, 1993; 
Selinger, 2006).  Any use of the term ‘nature’ must be carefully critiqued (Singer, 
1993; Habermas, 2003).  As already noted, a major limitation is the Western 
orientation of the chapter.  An obvious candidate for expanded discussion would be 
the ethics of craft practices (see e.g. Fry, 1992; Berger, 2003; Sennett, 2008; 
Gauntlett, 2011).  Finally, and perhaps most telling, has been the avoidance of any 
settlement on a particular ‘working definition’ of sustainability itself.  The 
conversations continue… 
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